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Viewing cable 06MANAGUA2445, CARTER CENTER COP SHARES OUR CONCERNS OVER CEDULA

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Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#06MANAGUA2445**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06MANAGUA2445	2006-11-02 23:50	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Managua

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx>
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<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx>
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion>
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006>
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx>
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu>
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006>
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu>

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8114
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002445

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DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/USOAS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2016
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PINR](#) [KDEM](#) [NU](#)
SUBJECT: CARTER CENTER COP SHARES OUR CONCERNS OVER CEDULA
DELIVERY, ORTEGA, S PREEMPTING VICTORY

REF: MANAGUA 02442

Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Carter Center COP Jaime Aparicio shares Ambassador's concerns that probably over 100,000 Nicaraguans will not possess national/voter IDs (cedulas) or temporary voting documents required to vote on November 5 and that Ortega may self-declare his victory -- which would be followed by election night violence. Although Aparicio expects some fraud on election day, he believes most of it has already occurred: Nicaragua's politicized electoral law favors the traditionally dominant Sandinista Liberation Front (FSLN) and Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC). He is confident that robust observation and the Etica y Transparencia's quick count will prevent major fraud vis a vis the presidential election, but fears that the CSE could finagle with the results of the National Assembly elections to favor the FSLN and PLC. Aparicio's recent public statements have been on the mark and he claims the Carter Center will call irregularities as it sees them. While President Carter appears to have lost some of his cachet with Ortega, he probably continues to be the foreigner who could exert the most influence on the FSLN candidate if the need arises. END SUMMARY.

CEDULA AND TEMPORARY VOTER DOC DELIVERY REMAINS A PROBLEM

¶2. (C) In their November 2 meeting, the Ambassador and Carter Center COP in Managua Jaime Aparicio concurred that problems with cedula and temporary voting document deliveries could prevent tens of thousands of Nicaraguans from voting on November 5. The Ambassador shared his recent conversation with a member of the OAS observer team, who estimated that over 100,000 Nicaraguans would not be able to vote because they have not received the necessary documents. (NOTE: This estimate tracks with IFES estimates. END NOTE.)

MOST OF THE FRAUD HAS ALREADY BEEN COMMITTED

¶3. (C) Aparicio, who expects some fraud to occur on election day, quipped that most of it has already occurred and only the "technical adjustments" remain. He explained that Nicaragua's politicized electoral law favors the traditionally dominant Sandinista Liberation Front (FSLN) and Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) -- according them control over the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), the voting tables (JRVs) and computation centers, and the ability for a candidate to win the election with only 35% of the valid votes counted. He dismissed the possibility of widespread

fraud on election day, noting he is confident that robust observation and Etica y Transparencia's quick count will prevent major fraud vis a vis the presidential election.

14. (C) Aparicio did not rule out the finagling of National Assembly candidate results to favor the FSLN and PLC. For example, fewer than 2,000 votes could determine the outcome of a departmental National Assembly seat, explained Aparicio. (NOTE: FSLN-PLC complicity regarding the assignment of Assembly seats could be expected in that the leadership of both parties seeks to continue their power-sharing pact. END NOTE.) Aparicio also shared our concern that the CSE could skew early results to favor Ortega.

CARTER CENTER WILL CALL IRREGULARITIES AS IT SEES THEM
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15. (C) Aparicio assured the Ambassador that the Carter Center will be alert, denouncing irregularities as it sees them and will call for calm if violence erupts. He will suggest that President Carter urge Ortega to refrain from declaring early victory and from resorting to violence - noting that President Carter is prepared to stay long enough to calm down any violence he sees and to await the CSE's full count.

M&R POLL SUGGESTS MONTEALEGRE IS THE ONLY CANDIDATE WHO COULD DEFEAT ORTEGA
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16. (C) Raising his recent conversation with M&R pollster Raul Obregon, Aparicio ventured that Liberal Nicaraguan Alliance candidate Eduardo Montealegre is the only candidate who can possibly defeat Daniel Ortega. He shared our view that the PLC's smear campaign has been effective in lowering

Liberal Nicaraguan Alliance candidate Eduardo Montealegre's numbers in the polls, especially in the more rural, northern departments -- but not enough to position Rizo as Ortega's closest competition.

COMMENT
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17. (C) Aparicio's recent public statements have been on the mark and generally more assertive than the OAS EOM's messages. While President Carter appears to have lost some of his cachet with Ortega, he probably continues to be the foreigner who could exert the most influence on the FSLN candidate if the need arises.
TRIVELLI